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Abstract: In order to tackle the question of refugee health care provision in 
relation to regime type, a three step approach was taken. First, regime type was 
shown to significantly influence various public health indicators; democracies 
increased health care quality due to constraints placed on the leader to appeal to 
constituents’ health care interests. Next, citizens under authoritarian regimes with 
democratic institutions were determined to receive better health care because of 
effective citizen lobbying for their own interests as well as constraints on the 
autocratic leaders to appeal to their larger constituency. Finally, while employing 
the selectorate theory of social goods provision, the effect of regime type on 
refugee health care quality was determined. Citizen lobbying for their own health 
care interests becomes detrimental to refugee interests; thus, more authoritarian 
regimes possess greater freedom to provide better health care to refugees than 
less authoritarian host countries.   
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Introduction:  
Health—both mental and physical—can paint the intensity of an individual’s societal and 
personal life in brilliant, colorful shades or dull, monotonous colors. Like the engine of a car, 
good health is often taken for granted until the moment it is taken away, or malfunctions. The 
goal, it would seem then, would be providing the maximum quality healthcare to the greatest 
number of people. To be sure, effective healthcare possesses a substantial scientific and 
technological component. However, the distribution of health care facilities, the education of 
health care professionals, the provision of a suitable infrastructure, and the enforcement of 
proper medical standards under times of peace and conflict are all intimately intertwined with the 
field of politics. The philosopher John Locke defined natural law as our right to protect “life, 
liberty, and possessions.” So how do we, as political scientists, best protect our right to a long, 
healthy life? 
The quality of provision and access to health care varies widely from country to country, 
regime to regime. Current political science literature accounts for this difference by emphasizing 
the variation in terms of regime type across various countries and time periods. The reasoning 
follows that a democratic country will provide a significantly better quality of health care for its 
citizens because of the greater political and civil freedoms afforded as well as the constraints that 
entail catering to a larger constituency. Authoritarian countries, which by their very nature do not 
face such large constituent constraints, will be less inclined to provide beyond the necessary 
baseline level of health care to its citizens. Refugees, however, are not significant actors in the 
interplay of electing a regime leader. Yet these individuals are still worthy of the right to a 
healthy life, and are often more in need of proper health care provision than regular citizens due 
to the loss of property, monetary possessions and political rights, the mental anguish, and the 
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dangerous and often fatal environments characteristic of the political refugee experience. Thus, 
does the particular regime type of the host country a refugee flees to and resides in affect the 
quality of healthcare she will be provided? According to previous research concerning the 
citizens of different regime types, the answer is a resounding “Yes.” However, precisely because 
of the constraints placed on democratic regimes to focus the provision of broad public goods 
such as health care toward its citizens, non-citizen groups such as refugees will subsequently 
receive better health care under authoritarian regimes. Autocratic leaders possess greater 
decision-making freedom in regards to distribution of both public and private goods to particular 
segments of its population, including refugees such as in the Palestinian case study. The 
Palestinian refugee situation is particularly interesting because of its longevity and concentration 
to a specific region, lending itself to pronounced health care effects and available data. 
Furthermore, this variation in the quality of health care provision provided extends to variation 
within particular regime types—when “democracy” is measured on a sliding scale, refugees will 
generally receive progressively worse or better health care. 
Part I: Does Democracy Matter? 
Theory:  
Democracy possesses its fair share of success stories—one only need look at the 
economic records and health indicators of most Western European countries or, for a more 
archetypal example, the United States. But are these accomplishments merely flukes caused by 
some lurking variable or is there something inherently “good” within the democratic model that 
paves the road to such success? According to previous research the latter appears to be the case: 
democratic regimes consistently provide better quality health care to their citizens than 
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authoritarian regimes because citizens in democracies can lobby for their own interests. 
Democratically elected leaders will subsequently provide broad societal goods, such as health 
care, to appeal to their larger constituencies.  
This theory is corroborated by numerous studies—affirming the power of citizens in 
democracies to realize their policy preferences in the face of conflicting refugee interests or other 
fiscal priorities. A study of 17 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1992 suggested that during 
economic crises, democracies were—despite the monetary losses—more inclined to increase 
allocation of resources toward social programs like health care. In contrast, authoritarian 
regimes’ social spending policy decisions were more influenced by the debilitating economic 
forces present (Brown and Hunter 1999, 789). Furthermore, a more comprehensive and recent 
study of 18 Latin American countries between the years 1970 to 2000 indicated a democracy’s 
greater long-term social expenditure in areas of social security, health, and education in contrast 
to smaller health and education investment in highly repressive authoritarian regimes (Huber et 
al. 2008, 420). This spending discrepancy between regime types is accounted for by a 
democracy’s greater public constraints and willingness to provide social goods, especially during 
times of contentious electoral races (Brown and Hunter 1999, 787), in addition to greater 
opportunities for “self-organization of the underprivileged and their capacity to push for better 
health and education services” (Huber et al. 2008, 432). This increase in health care spending 
within democratic governments is indicative of a better quality of health care for its citizens. 
Furthermore, within democracies, barriers to entry and exit are low for leaders, in 
addition to low costs of participation for citizens (Lake and Baum 2001, 590). Thus, democracies 
can provide their citizens more avenues for direct and indirect participation in the political 
process, making it easier to enact the majority’s policy goals—particularly better health care 
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provision. Furthermore, the leaders within democratic regimes are constrained by public opinion, 
and must enact favorable policy if they wish to remain in office; the costs of establishing a new 
leader are relatively low within democracies, ordinarily consisting of a free, statewide vote (Lake 
and Baum 2001, 596). Autocracies, on the other hand, possess high costs of political 
participation, particularly for dissenters, in addition to high barriers to entry for challengers of 
the incumbent. Thus, autocratic leaders are less likely to waste monetary resources on improving 
social goods such as health care when it is likely they will remain in office (Lake and Baum 
2001, 596). The assertion that democracies provide a higher level of public health care services 
than autocracies was confirmed by a global cross-sectional and time varying statistical analysis 
of various health indicators such as life expectancy and safe water access (Lake and Baum 2001, 
617). It is important to note that these citizens are lobbying for their own health care interests, 
and thus removing potential resources for non-citizens. 
Hypothesis: Democratic regimes will provide better quality health care for their citizens than 
authoritarian regimes.  
Data & Methods:  
 In order to accurately answer the premise of the hypothesis, various health indicators 
were chosen from a dataset obtained primarily from the WorldBank, in addition to the United 
Nations (UN) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The dependent variables chosen 
measured various aspects of health care including fertility rate (births per woman), improved 
water source access (% of population), life expectancy at birth (years), human development 
index (HDI), government expenditure on health (% GDP), and mortality rate under-5 (per 1000). 
These dependent variables were regressed on the independent variables of regime type as well as 
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control variables comprised of real GDP per capita and number of conflicts. Regime type was 
coded as follows: (1) for authoritarian and (0) for democratic (Gandhi 2008). Furthermore, the 
variables were regressed using a fixed effects model to account for similarities across time 
between the same countries. The sample consisted of 44 countries within Asia, between the years 
of 1980 and 2000. An Asian sample was chosen to ensure that the host countries harboring 
Palestinian refugees experienced the same democratic citizen lobbying and electoral constraints 
in regards to health care provision, while providing the necessary degrees of freedom. 
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Data Analysis: 
 The results of the statistical analysis largely confirm existing theory emphasizing a 
democracy’s greater provision of health care services to its citizens in relation to an authoritarian 
state. The lobbying opportunities and low costs of political participation present within 
democracies serve to effectively further the collective health care interests of citizens. As 
depicted by Table 1, regime type significantly affects several health indicators including fertility 
rate, life expectancy, HDI, mortality rate, and improved water source access. The data trends all 
followed the pattern of democracy providing higher quality health care. Sample countries 
identified as authoritarian corresponded with an increase in fertility rate versus democratic states, 
which is indicative of poorer citizen health. Further, when regime type decreased, indicating 
democracy = (0), life expectancy increased. The same negative relationship was found for the 
Human Development Index, which measures health based on life expectancy, education, and 
per-capita GNI. Democratic countries possessed a higher HDI than autocratic countries. The 
positive health effects afforded to the citizens of democratic nations was further confirmed by the 
statistical analyses of mortality rate as well as percent access to improved water sources. 
Mortality rate is significantly higher in authoritarian regimes within Asia when compared to 
democracies and the increase in the percent of the population with access to safe water can be 
significantly explained by democracy as well. 
The only health indicator that was not significantly affected by either regime type was 
percent GDP expenditure on health. This could be an artifact of the many authoritarian Middle 
Eastern countries that provide generous social benefits, such as universal health care provision, 
in exchange for a lack of political rights. Nevertheless, these statistical results clearly emphasize 
that current literature consensus regarding regime type versus health care provision does not 
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constitute a “fluke” but signals something fundamental about the nature of democracy in 
providing better health care for its citizens. Democracy actually does seem to be a deciding 
factor in accounting for the variation in health policies across countries globally. And citizens of 
democratic countries do effectively lobby for their own health care interests, even potentially to 
the detriment of refugees residing within those democratic countries. 
Part II: Does the Degree of Authoritarianism Matter? 
Theory:  
 Are labels such as “democracy” and “autocracy” too restrictive? For instance, North 
Korea is widely regarded as a much stricter, almost tyrannical, authoritarian regime in 
comparison to an authoritarian country like Jordan. Is something significant lost to current 
political science literature when all-encompassing binomial terms such as “democracy” or 
“autocracy” are used in place of a more varied approach while considering regime type and its 
effects on health care provision?  
 Mere “authoritarianism,” then, is not an accurate portrayal of the varied regimes that exist 
in the international political landscape. Regimes can be afflicted with varying degrees of 
corruption, permit varying levels of public dissension and petition, and protect the right to 
association, to private property, and to freedom of speech to varying extents. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that all political leaders seek to remain in office and maximize their personal rents--
money, influence, power, prestige or whatever other value the leader gains from maintaining 
their leadership position. Thus, autocratic leaders may establish democratic institutions, even if 
only nominally so, as instruments to co-opt public support when compliance is necessary for 
internal prosperity, and thus maintain a steady flow of high personal rents (Gandhi 2008).  
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These democratic, or quasi-democratic, institutions allow for gradations in the level of 
authoritarianism of a country and often appear in the presence of parties or legislatives bodies. 
Further, these institutions can vary in multiparty (2
+
) and single party systems as well as 
appointed, hereditary or elected legislative systems. Similarly, countries can vary in the degree to 
which they allow for various political rights and civil liberties. Political rights include electoral 
processes, party systems, and the political treatment of minority groups, while civil liberties 
include factors such as freedom of speech, assembly, education and belief, personal and financial 
autonomy, and an impartial judiciary. Clearly variations exist within regime types. 
In any case, these democratic institutions serve as ideal forums for citizens to announce 
policy preferences and provide an institutionalized means of possessing ostensible decision 
making power in regards to policy outcomes. In addition, institutions are an effective means of 
safely containing opposition demands for the incumbent autocrat (Gandhi 2008). Thus, citizens 
of institutionalized authoritarian regimes are provided the important democratic ability to lobby 
for their health care interests, which contributes to increased constraints on the autocratic leader. 
As previously stated, such lobbying in democracies leads to an increase in the quality of health 
care provided to citizens. Current political science literature has failed to obtain significant 
results in regards to the presence of democratic institutions within authoritarian states and its 
effects on the provision of social goods (Gandhi 2008). This sets the scene for analyzing the 
effects of democratic institutions on one specific social good, namely health care, and 
subsequently whether less authoritarian countries consistently provide better health care to their 
citizens.  
Citizens residing in authoritarian regimes with democratic institutions still lobby 
effectively to constrain an autocratic leader and constrict his personal freedom to allocate health 
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care resources toward marginal groups such as refugees. Even if no actual decision-making 
power is provided to the citizens, the existence of democratic institutions within authoritarian 
regimes remains a valuable measure of the level of division within the state and the extent of the 
autocrat’s control over his citizens. Citizens residing in democratically institutionalized 
authoritarian regimes possess leaders who require the cooperation of their citizens and are 
willing to provide democratic institutions to co-opt public support. Consequently, this leader will 
possess a disposition more amenable to providing greater social concessions in the form of 
higher quality health care for his citizens. Theoretically then, health care quality under these 
autocratic regimes will be better than under those without democratic institutions, ruled by 
leaders who possess no need to provide health care concessions to their citizens. Thus, not only 
does regime type account for the differences in health care provision across countries, but the 
differing levels of authoritarianism across countries accounts for such health variation as well.  
Hypothesis: A country’s degree of authoritarianism is negatively correlated to the quality of 
health care provided to its citizens. 
Data & Methods:  
 The statistical analysis of this regression was similar to the method of Part I; however, the 
health indicators of only the authoritarian regime-coded Asian countries were utilized. This 
lowered the number of observations to 660 authoritarian samples across a timeline spanning the 
years 1980 to 2000. Ultimately, the same dataset was used for this regression as in Part I, but 
with the democratic regime observations omitted. The dependent health indicator variables were 
then regressed on the party and legislature system (IV) as well as several control variables. First, 
degree of authoritarianism was measured by focusing on the presence of democratic institutions: 
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types of parties (more than one = 2; one = 1; non-existent = 0) as well as types of legislatures 
(elected = 2; appointed = 1; non-existent = 0) (Gandhi 2008). Real GDP per capita and number 
of conflicts constituted the control variables for the sample and health indicators were identical 
to the dependent variables used in the Part I regime type study. 
 Second, to gain a more comprehensive picture of the varying degrees of authoritarianism 
across countries, Freedomhouse rankings for all of the 44 Asian countries were obtained from a 
time period spanning the years 2000-2009 as well. These whole integer rankings range from a 
“free” status ranking of 1 to a “not free” status ranking of 7. In addition, political rights are 
distinguished from the civil liberties afforded to the citizens of each country. Political rights 
measure a country’s electoral processes, party structure, political pluralism and participation, 
corruption, as well as the functioning of the government while the civil liberties variable 
measures freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
personal autonomy, and private property protections (freedomhouse.org). Furthermore, because 
of the high correlation between the political rights and civil liberties variables, these independent 
variables were regressed on the subsequent dependent variables separately. Control variables 
include total population, land area (km
2
), and GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Number of 
conflicts was omitted as a control variable due to a lack of data points, which significantly 
lowered the number of observations in the regressions. The conflict variable was never 
significant for any of the civil liberties or political rights regressions; however, removing this 
control did allow significant results for the civil liberties variable in relation to different health 
indicators. Finally, health indicators obtained from the WorldBank database include the human 
development indicator (HDI), physicians (per 1,000 people), infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live 
births), under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000), life expectancy at birth (years), improved water source 
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(% of population with access),  hospital beds (per 1,000 people),  public health expenditure (% of 
GDP), health expenditure per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $), and fertility rate (births 
per woman).  
 Lastly, by analyzing the effect of degrees of authoritarianism on an Asian country 
sample, citizen health care lobbying and leader constraint effects can be plausibly extended 
toward the Middle Eastern Palestinian refugee host country experiences. Furthermore, this 
allows for the effects of these democratic institutions to be measured with an appropriate number 
of degrees of freedom. Because all the Palestinian host countries are considered authoritarian 
states, the question of whether a country’s level of authoritarianism significantly affects the 
health care quality provided to citizens possesses important implications for the refugees of those 
host countries. 
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Data Analysis: 
 In regards to democratic institutions (Table 2), the hypothesis that possessing these 
institutions would increase national health was largely upheld. As the presence of legislative and 
party institutions decreases in authoritarian states, or as states become more authoritarian and do 
not provide democratic institutions, fertility rate increases significantly—a sign that designates a 
decrease in national health. When the legislative institution increased in democratic nature, life 
expectancy increased in addition to a significant decrease in under-5 child mortality rates--
national health increased. The greater policy making and lobbying power that is associated with 
the legislative branch of the government allows citizens to possess a more direct influence on 
leaders within the legislature and to overtly press for greater health benefits for citizens at the 
expense of refugees. Additionally, when authoritarian states provided more democratically 
oriented party institutions, it corresponded with a subsequent increase in the human development 
index. Furthermore, the coefficients of the significant results in Table 2 for legislature and party 
are larger than the corresponding coefficients in Table 1, where democratic regimes were 
included in the regressions. This presumably indicates the greater influence that these democratic 
institutions possess within authoritarian regimes, where citizens are typically denied such 
methods of political participation, on spurring greater health care gains for citizens. Thus, the 
data show that the mere presence of democratic institutions acts as a boon to an autocracy’s 
citizens in regards to health care provision. 
 When measuring degrees of authoritarianism using Freedomhouse rankings, the same 
trend touting the positive effects of decreased levels of authoritarianism on health care quality is 
maintained. Civil liberties and political rights are both different measures of the “freedom” of a 
country, whose effects are difficult to separate from each other. Nevertheless, democracies are 
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typically associated with the presence of various political rights and civil freedoms largely absent 
in autocracies, whose leaders do not need to serve the interests of the entire citizen population. 
The level of civil liberties present in a country produced results congruent with the hypothesis--
as citizens were provided more “democratic” freedoms, there was a subsequent rise in quality of 
national health. Specifically, as shown by Table 3, an increase in civil liberties (which 
corresponds to a decrease in the numerical scale), in other words a more democratic state, results 
in a corresponding significant decrease in fertility rates, increase in life expectancy, increase in 
HDI, increase in access to improved water sources, and a decrease in the infant mortality rate as 
well as the under-5 mortality rate. When citizens can freely assemble and disseminate 
information openly, important health information can spread more rapidly and proper health 
practices can be discussed widely in public forums. Furthermore, when private enterprise and 
property is protected by the state, quality health care is more easily accessed and affordable. And 
when citizens lobby for their health care interests in democratic institutions, leaders are 
constrained to appeal to the larger constituency by providing broad public goods such as health 
care. Ultimately, the evidence strongly indicates that authoritarian--and even democratic--
regimes are not static, homogenous entities, and that the variation between different authoritarian 
states does possess a significant impact on a country’s quality of health care provision toward its 
citizens.  
 Furthermore, the consistent non-effect of regime type, civil liberties or political rights, 
and democratic institutions on the government health expenditure of a country possesses 
interesting implications for the role of the state in promoting the health of its citizens. States that 
possess democratic institutions, or that are less authoritarian according to Freedomhouse 
rankings, promote public health not necessarily by increasing government spending on health 
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programs, but by promoting an environment conducive to the presence of civil liberties and 
political rights typical of democracies. Maintaining an infrastructure that promotes a citizen’s 
ability to lobby for her own particular health interests or to freely discuss various public health 
measures—creating a foundation built on democratic freedoms—significantly affects a nation’s 
public health and may encourage private health care establishment. Furthermore, the presence of 
democratic institutions may not necessarily increase government health care spending, but 
simply make spending more efficient, accountable, and focused on targeting a greater 
distribution of citizens. Leaders of authoritarian states with democratic institutions are more 
constrained by their larger constituency to distribute health care spending more equitably.  
Part III: What About the Refugees? 
Theory:  
Current political literature regarding regime type and its effects on health care provision 
largely focuses its attention on the implications for citizens of the state. But what about the 
stateless? Do refugees possess enough influence to significantly change a political leader’s 
actions in regard to state health care provision? Is the theoretical mechanism for refugees similar 
to that of citizens or does the current citizen-focused theory need to be amended to account for 
refugees’ influence within their respective host countries? If so, it would signal an important 
addition to the political literature regarding individuals often forgotten and assumed to be 
without a political voice. 
Refugees, by their very nature, are often overlooked—in legal protections, in politics, in 
polite conversation. However, it seems a bit brazen to neglect the impact refugees may have on 
the policies of a host country—for example, Palestinian refugees comprise 33.4 % of the total 
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Jordanian population, at 1.9 million registered refugees (Annual Report, 2007). This is further 
compounded by the unfortunate longevity—over 50 years—of a Palestinian refugee presence in 
the Middle Eastern region. Since the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli Conflict, Palestinians 
have been residing in dilapidated, “temporary” camps, confronted with frequent disruption of 
access to basic services such as education, housing, and health care due to checkpoints erected 
by the Israeli military—over 600 established by June 2008—to block Palestinian movement 
(Giacaman et al. 2009, 840).  Furthermore, they must cope with curfew, housing demolitions, 
land confiscations, severe infrastructure damage in addition to restriction from accessing key 
water resources, as well as the psychological distress and uprooted social order associated with 
such a lifestyle (Giacaman et al. 2009, 839). Emergency medical vehicles are routinely stopped 
and delayed at various checkpoints instituted by the Israeli government around the West Bank 
and Gaza. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has, since 1949, specifically 
focused on assisting the 4.7 million registered Palestinian refugees located across a Middle 
Eastern region encompassing the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. In the face of 
such apparent powerlessness, it would be easy to assume negligible impact on state policy. Yet 
sixty years residing in the same area must build up some political influence and produce a 
measurable impact on local policy. 
It has already been established that less authoritarian states provide better health care to 
their citizens due to the democratic effects of citizen lobbying and leaders catering to larger 
constituencies. But does this tenet still hold true for non-citizens, like Palestinian refugees, who 
primarily reside in four different autocratic Middle Eastern host countries, each with a different 
degree of authoritarianism? As non-citizens of the state, refugees cannot feasibly interact with 
provided democratic institutions like parties or legislatures. However, refugees can still partially 
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reap the benefits of broad public goods such as civil liberties--freedom of association and 
expression, protection of economic activity, and fair rule of law. While technically not afforded 
these rights because they are not citizens, refugees can benefit from an atmosphere of ample civil 
liberties conducive to promoting public health. For instance, discouraging Palestinian refugees 
from freely associating would be much more difficult to enforce if the government already 
provided such rights to citizens. Like the citizens of the state, broadly accessible public goods 
such as civil liberties will likely encourage positive interaction with the state and lead to an 
increase in national health.  
Additionally, refugees can and do influence members of the “selectorate” who do possess 
the political rights to interact with provided democratic institutions. Selectorate theory posits that 
each regime leader maintains office through the selectorate, or the special segment of the 
population that possesses decision-making power in regards to establishing a political leader 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). For example, the selectorate in a democracy would be all those 
citizens eligible to vote. In contrast, the selectorate in an authoritarian state can be much smaller 
and is typically comprised of influential members of the state such as military leaders and 
wealthy businessmen (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Each leader must surpass the threshold 
set by the winning coalition, or the proportion of selectorate support necessary for the leader to 
maintain power (Morrow et al. 2008, 393). Subsequently, leaders maintain office by distributing 
public goods and private benefits toward the support coalition, or the segment of the selectorate 
that prevailed in establishing their leader of choice (Morrow et al. 2008, 393).  
If the support coalition segment of the selectorate falls below the winning coalition 
threshold, then the leader is vulnerable to removal from office by a challenger (Morrow et al. 
2008, 393).  In democracies, maintaining office entails enacting the policy preferences of the 
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support coalition while offering some political concessions to the entire selectorate. Because of 
the larger size of the selectorate and winning coalition, these concessions are usually in the form 
of broad public goods, such as health care, national security, and effective economic policies, 
that can be distributed to and benefit efficiently the most members of the selectorate. In 
authoritarian states, these rewards manifest themselves in the form of private benefits to the 
select few members of the support coalition that comprise the typically smaller winning 
coalition. This smaller selectorate size encourages the distribution of private goods such as tax 
breaks, manufacturing monopolies, and direct financial payments to maintain support above the 
winning coalition minimum (Morrow et al. 2008, 393). Selectorate theory remains a reputable 
theory that retained its legitimacy against criticisms concerning residualization methods and has 
continued to be a significant predictor of public and private goods provision in terms of winning 
coalition size (Morrow et al. 2008, 399). 
How do democratic institutions and non-selectorate members, such as refugees, play a 
role in selectorate theory? In democracies the leader possesses a large selectorate and winning 
coalition size, and thus it is more efficient to distribute broad public goods, such as health care, 
to cater to his constituency. Non-selectorate members, as in refugees, can largely partake in these 
broad public goods, unless it is required to be a citizen in order to receive the benefits (Figure 1). 
Authoritarian leaders, on the other hand, will likely distribute a small amount of earned rents 
toward non-selectorate members in show of self-preservation. In authoritarian states, non-
selectorate members comprise a majority of the population--their cooperation is essential for 
internal prosperity, and discord within the non-selectorate population can lead to potential 
problems for individuals who are members of the selectorate. Thus, in regards to health care 
provision, authoritarian leaders will provide some measure of health care to non-selectorate 
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citizens and refugees residing within the country to prevent a health epidemic or mass protests--
whose negative effects could trickle down to members of the selectorate and result in the leader’s 
removal from office (Figure 1). 
 Figure 1. Selectorate Theory 
When authoritarian leaders provide democratic institutions, even “sham” democratic 
institutions, they inevitably increase the size of their winning coalition and decrease the 
influential power of each individual member of the selectorate. This results in decreased personal 
rents for the autocrat because more of his personal stores must be distributed to the larger 
winning coalition, more likely in the form of more efficient broad public goods. It has already 
been shown that the provision of institutions such as a legislature and party system increase 
national health within authoritarian regimes. Thus, when citizens lobby within these democratic 
institutions for increased state health care spending for fellow citizen members of the selectorate 
and winning coalition, the autocratic leaders become constrained by the public opinion. 
Subsequently, spending that would have been distributed towards non-selectorate members, 
namely refugees, are now given to the citizens instead (Figure 1). Thus, these leaders are more 
inclined to turn to third party organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
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(UNRWA) to provide for refugee healthcare--and in the process keep a greater amount of 
personal rents for themselves. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders who do not possess such 
institutions would be more reluctant to increase their selectorate size and partially forfeit 
authority over to organizations such as the UNRWA, despite the prospect of free refugee 
healthcare. Nevertheless, if the citizens of a country possess strong ties to the refugee population 
and lobby for refugee health care interests within existing democratic institutions in addition to 
their own, then authoritarian leaders will be more likely to personally distribute as well as to rely 
on third-party organizations to provide public goods such as health care.  
Hypotheses: 
1. Those refugees residing in host countries with a greater number of democratic institutions 
will receive a poorer quality of health care from the state, and subsequently have a greater 
reliance on health care provision by third party organizations. 
2.  Refugee health care will significantly increase in quality when there are strong ties 
between the host country citizens and the refugees, in addition to democratic institutions.  
Data & Methods: 
Palestinian refugee health indicators were obtained primarily through datasets provided 
by the UNRWA. Data was provided for the four main Palestinian refugee host countries: Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank & Gaza. Health indicators include total fertility rate, aging 
index, primary healthcare facilities per 100,000, doctors per 100,000 registered refugees, nurses 
per 100,000 registered refugees, annual per capita health budget allocations (US$), infant 
mortality (per 1000 live births), child mortality rate (< 3 years) per 1000 live births, prevalence 
of anemia among children < 3 years of age, percentage of camp shelters with access to sewerage 
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facilities, prevalence of hypertension among population served 40 years and above (%), and 
number of mumps cases reported. These Annual Health Reports are available for the years 2009, 
2007, 2006, 2004, and 2003. Freedomhouse civil liberties rankings for the four host countries 
were used to measure democracy generally. Finally, graphs were prepared charting the 
progression of a single host country’s civil liberties score as well as one health indicator across 
the years 2000-2009. 
Additionally, the UN mandated allocation of health resources, detailed by the UNRWA 
Health Reports, was compared to healthcare data for the general population of each host country. 
Host country health statistics were compared with correlating Palestinian refugee health care 
statistics to derive a ratio of citizen versus refugee health care quality indicators. The reasoning 
following that those countries approaching a 1:1 ratio of citizen versus refugee health care 
indicators would be providing the greatest allocation of state resources toward refugee health 
care provision. Subsequently, those with large discrepancies in refugee versus citizen health care 
ratios would be largely relying on the UNRWA for refugee health care and not allocating a large 
amount of state resources toward refugee health care concerns. Ratios were derived by dividing 
host country statistics by Palestinian refugee statistics for the health indicators comprised of: 
percent sewage facility access, health expenditure per capita, mortality rate under-5 (per 1,000), 
mortality rate infant (per 1,000 live births), and physicians (per 100,000 people).  
Data Analysis: 
 Based upon general Freedomhouse rankings during the 21
st
 century, the four Palestinian 
refugee host countries, ranked from least to most authoritarian, are Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank 
& Gaza, and Syria. It is also important to note the unique case of the West Bank & Gaza as 
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territories occupied by Israel, as well as to account for the Gaza War that occurred between the 
years 2008-2009. When comparing the ratios of health indicators between state and UNRWA 
figures, the data are remarkably similar to expected values. Syria consistently recorded values 
close to a 1:1 ratio, indicating the greatest state involvement in health care provision for 
Palestinian refugees. For instance, for the Health Spending per Capita ratio, Syria averaged 
around 10, Lebanon 25, and Jordan 50 (data missing for West Bank & Gaza). Regarding the 
physicians per 100,000 ratio, Syria remains closest to 1:1 with a ratio of 4, followed by the West 
Bank & Gaza at 9, Lebanon 23, and Jordan 48. Palestinian refugees harbored within Syria, while 
not considered citizens, are entitled to full social rights (Sabatinelli 2009, 1063), consistent with 
the theory of autocratic, democratic institution-absent, leaders possessing much more freedom to 
distribute small social goods such as healthcare to non-selectorate members.  
For both child and infant mortality, however, Syria recorded a ratio of .5, Lebanon .7, 
Jordan around 1, and the West Bank & Gaza at 1.25. This time Jordan possessed the ratio closest 
to 1:1. Similarly for the sewage facility access ratio, Jordan and Syria both possessed a value 
around 1, with the West Bank and Gaza around 1.23 and Lebanon around 1.35. This could be 
due to the large proportion—almost a third of the population—of Palestinian refugees living in 
Jordan. Palestinians residing in Jordan are uniquely entitled to Jordanian citizenship unless they 
have emigrated from the Gaza Strip. If so, they face several restrictions concerning higher 
education access as well as prohibition from certain civil services (Sabatinelli 2009, 1063). Such 
discrimination occurs due to the Jordanian government seeking to dispel images of the country as 
a dumping ground for Palestinians unwanted by the Israeli government. Nevertheless, this 
ubiquitous Palestinian presence likely forged strong ties between refugee and Jordanian citizens 
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and resulted in selectorate lobbying within democratic institutions for increased health care 
provision for the refugees.  
Overall, Lebanon, the second-least authoritarian country, seems to have provided the 
poorest quality health care to the Palestinian refugees, requiring the UNRWA to provide medical 
treatment to its refugee population. The lack of significant ties between members of the 
selectorate and the refugees, along with the constraints likely placed on Lebanon’s leader 
regarding increased citizen-focused health care spending remains a plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are “exonerated from the national taxation system 
but excluded from social security, and prevented from practicing 70 different professions 
including medicine…making this refugee community the most vulnerable and financially 
dependent of those served by the UNRWA outside the occupied Palestinian territory” 
(Sabatinelli 2009, 1063). And concerning the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian refugee 
autonomy is severely limited by the Israeli military occupation and refugees within this territory 
are among those with the lowest life quality among all the countries surveyed by the WHO. 
Respondents expressed high levels of fear, anxiety, and threats to personal and familial safety 
(Giacaman 2009, 842). Thus, highly authoritarian regime leaders still possess free discretion to 
choose not to provide specific non-selectorate members access to broad health care goods. Yet 
even refugees within the Occupied Territories possess standards of health, literacy, and education 
generally higher than several surrounding Arab countries (Giacaman 2009, 842).  
 While lacking the firm reliability of statistically significant evidence, the following 
graphs remain an important tool in outlining general trends regarding host country health care 
provision to Palestinian refugees. Civil liberties constitute broad social goods that can be shared 
with non-selectorate refugee members of the population, and potentially increase refugee health. 
I m  | 27 
 
As a measure of democracy, however, expected results entail an increase in public health 
provision as civil liberties decrease (numerically increase), or as countries become more 
authoritarian. In conjunction with each host country’s health policies toward refugees in addition 
to the health indicator ratios, the following graphical trends constitute compelling evidence of the 
expected results.  
 
Figure 2 Jordan: Hypertension Rates 
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Figure 4 Syria: Hypertension Rates 
The percent hypertension prevalence health indicator illustrates the expected trend of more 
authoritarian states providing a measurably better quality of health care to its refugee population. 
For instance, in Figure 2, when Jordan experienced an increase in democratic nature (5 to 4) 
between 2003 and 2004, there was a corresponding increase in hypertension rates within its 
refugee population. Undoubtedly, there is difficulty in interpreting results when variation in the 
“democracy” variable occurs at most by increments of one, in addition to the scarcity of data 
points for the refugee health indicators. However, when taken together with Jordan’s close 1:1 
ratio of citizen versus refugee health indicators, as well as Jordan’s current policy of granting 
citizenship to Palestinian refugees, expectations seem to be validated by the evidence. 
Furthermore, Lebanon, a host country with large discrepancies between refugee and citizen 
health indicator ratios—suggesting a lack of government involvement in refugee health care 
provision—experienced increased hypertension rates when the “democracy” variable increased. 
In Figure 3, a higher level of democracy between the years 2004 and 2005 (5 to 4) as well as 
2008 and 2009 (4 to 3), correspond with an increase in hypertension rates from 9.9% in 2003 to 
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refugee interests when constrained first by citizen interests, as evidenced by Lebanon’s denial of 
refugee access to state health care. The more autocratic host country Syria, however, allows 
refugees access to the state health care system and possessed health indicator ratios much closer 
to a 1:1 relationship. And as evidenced by Figure 4, an increase in the regime’s democratic 
nature between the years of 2005 to 2006 (7 to 6) correlated with a jump in refugee hypertension 
rates from 10.8% in 2004 to 16.1% in 2006 and eventually to 19% in 2009. The Syrian leader 
most likely became constrained to allocate more state health care resources toward citizens 
comprising the larger selectorate at the expense of refugee health care concerns. This manifested 
itself in higher Palestinian refugee hypertension rates.  
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Figure 6 Syria: # Mumps Cases 
A similar story can be interpreted from the health indicator, number of mumps cases reported. 
Both Syria and Jordan undergo similar trends where an increase in the democratic nature of a 
regime corresponds with an increase in number of mumps cases reported, or a decrease in 
refugee health. For instance, in Figure 5, Jordan experiences an increase in democracy between 
the years 2003 and 2004 (5 to 4) and subsequently undergoes a sharp spike in the number of 
mumps cases reported—from 315 in 2003 to 764 in 2004. Further, the number of mumps cases 
stabilizes to a count of 38 in 2009 after a corresponding decrease in democracy between the 
years 2007 and 2008 (4 to 5). Perhaps the Jordanian autocratic leader was constrained against 
investing in health care resources for refugees under periods with greater democratic institutions, 
but once taken away, had freer rein to combat a potentially disastrous outbreak that could trickle 
up to selectorate members. Figure 6 depicts an increase in the number of mumps cases reported 
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Figure 7 Syria: Primary Health Care Facilities 
Finally, after an increase in Syria’s democratic ranking between the years 2005 and 2006 (7 to 
6), the number of primary healthcare facilities devoted to refugees decreased, from 5.7 in 2003 to 
4.9 in 2009. Thus, the trends indicate an overall decrease in refugee health care provision when 
authoritarian states increase in democratic nature or acquire more democratic institutions.  
Conclusion: 
There are undoubtedly numerous reasons for the lack of accounting for refugee 
populations in the current political literature--lack of data, the transient nature of refugees, the 
greater policy impact of citizens. However, by including the effects of refugees within the 
context of current theories concerning regime type and its effects on health care quality, a clearer 
image of a complex political mosaic can be obtained. Democracy, however, appears to be doing 
its job: serving the interests of its constituents, and providing political freedoms and broad social 
goods to its citizens—even at the expense of non-citizen refugees. This can hardly be considered 
a “bad” thing. However, refugees remain human beings that matter not only in a human context, 
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Thus, what are the implications of these findings? Are refugee and citizen interests 
inherently in opposition to one another? Not necessarily. Further research should be conducted to 
assess if these results can be extended to other refugee populations, as well as how refugees can 
forge solid ties with host country populations and lobby for shared health care interests. Further, 
this research does not advocate that refugees fleeing from oppression should seek out harshly 
authoritarian regimes in favor of democratic countries like the United States. Such refugees must 
consider the full impact a host country will have on numerous aspects of their lives—a fair legal 
system, a culture of political and civil freedoms, ample economic and welfare opportunities—not 
just health care provision. Rather, when faced with a choice between an authoritarian regime 
with or without democratic institutions, refugees will likely encounter a greater degree of health 
care provision when the autocratic host country leader is not constrained by citizen interests in 
the form of democratic institutions. Perhaps the rapid, democratically-oriented revolutionary 
movements currently spreading across the Middle East will correspond to new developments in 
the health care provision for long-term citizens as well as refugees. Nevertheless, rather than 
viewing previous research as a diatribe against autocracy or democracy, hopefully the intricate 
relationship between refugees, citizens, health care, and the governments they live under has 
become slightly more illuminated.  
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